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In Florida varying degrees of formality are required in order to
insure specific performance of a contract to convey Blackacre. These
formalities may vary in degree from those of an oral contract 1 to those
of a contract in full compliance with the conveyancing statute. 2 This
situation arises from the fact that it is not only one's estate or interest

in real property, but also one's status or use of his property at the
time he contracts,3 that controls the formalities of execution necessary to insure specific performance.
Assume, for example, that the contract sought to be specifically

enforced falls within the Statute of Frauds. 4 Generally, specific
performance of the contract to convey would simply require that it
be evidenced by a writing. No witnesses would be required, 5 nor
would any special language be needed, 6 so long as the property
were sufficiently identified.7 If the contract were oral, without more,
a failure to perform would not subject the vendor to specific performance of his agreement,8 although other remedies might be available
to the vendee. When the vendor accepts payment, however, and
puts the vendee in possession, he is estopped by part performance of
0

W. D. Frederick, Jr., B.A. 1956, Duke University; LL.B. 1961, University
of Florida; Member of Orlando, Florida, Bar.
Frank C. Logan, B.S. 1957, LL.B. 1962, University of Florida; Member of
Clearwater, Florida, Bar.
1. E.g., Board of Public Instruction of Palm Beach County v. McDonald, 143
Fla. 377, 196 So. 859 (1940) (an oral land exchange contract with part performance); Miller v. Carr, 137 Fla. 114, 188 So. 103 (1939) (an oral contract to
devise where one party has fully performed); Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Cravey,
101 Fla. 155, 134 So. 232 (1931) (purchaser in possession under oral contract
in possession having made improvements thereon); Taylor v. Mathews, 53 Fla.
776, 44 So. 146 (1907) (an oral contract with possession previously delivered).
2. FLA. STAT. §689.01 (1961).
3. Zimmerman v. Diedrich, 97 So. 2d 120, 121 (Fla. 1957).
4. FLA. STAT. §725.01 (1961).
5. E.g., Lente v. Clarke, 22 Fla. 515, 519, 1 So. 149, 151 (1886).
6. E.g., Meek v. Briggs, 80 Fla. 487, 86 So. 271 (1920). But see Rundel v.
Gordon, 92 Fla. 1110, 111 So. 386 (1927).
7. E.g., Lente v. Clarke, 22 Fla. 515, 520, 1 So. 149, 152 (1886).
8. FRLA. STAT. §725.01 (1961); see DeValencia v. Pace, 146 Fla. 159, 200 So.
370 (1941).
[353]

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1963

1

UNIVERSITY
OF FLORIDA
LAW
REVIEW
Florida Law
Review, Vol.
16, Iss.
3 [1963], Art.[Vol.
1 XVI

the oral contract from relying on the Statute of Frauds, and the vendee can obtain specific performance of the oral contract.0
In additon to the criteria set out above for specific performance,
the status of the vendor and his use of the property at the time he
contracts will superimpose additional requirements upon those previously mentioned. Assume, for example, that the vendor is a married
woman contracting to relinquish dower or convey her separate property. It would appear at first blush that, given the circumstances of
part performance as above, the same oral contract would be sufficient
to compel specific performance against her, but as we shall see, her
status as a married woman and the fact that she is either relinquishing dower or conveying her separate property will bring into play
requirements entirely different from those originally considered. And,
if the land that she intends to convey is homestead property, a virtual
Pandora's box of legal pitfalls is opened.
The purpose of this article is to consider both the function and the
propriety of the requirement of executional formalities for the specific performance in Florida of contracts to convey a married woman's
separate property or to relinquish her inchoate dower rights. Necessary to this inquiry is a consideration of contracts to convey homestead property insofar as the law governing these contracts is related
to the former transactions.

Tim FomwAL=r

OF EXEcuION REQirE voR
SPECiaiC PmERmANCE UNDER SECnON 708.07

In order to emphasize the important distinction between a conveyance or relinquishment of dower, and a contract to convey or
relinquish dower, one must bear in mind that a conveyance is technically the passage of legal title to real property. Normally, the conveyance is evidenced and consummated by a deed that is executed in
certain statutory form. Without this form, there will be no conveyance; no legal title will pass. 10 Confusion arises from the fact that the
deed is often referred to as a conveyance. Technically, this is a misnomer, but it is unlikely to be remedied because of the force of common usage. The important thing presently, however, is to distinguish
a conveyance, as a writing or deed, from a contract to convey. It

is equally important to distinguish between a relinquishment of
dower and a contract to relinquish. Since the contract is only the
promise to convey or relinquish, it does not pass legal title, but merely
raises an equitable interest in the promisee. It is this equitable in9. See note 1 supra.
10. E.g., Skinner Mfg. Co. v. Wright, 56 Fla. 561, 47 So. 931 (1909).
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terest raised by the contract to convey which moves the chancellor to
specifically enforce the promise to convey. This is not to suggest,
however, that contracts to convey or relinquish are without formality.
Normally, the Statute of Frauds requires that such contracts be evidenced by a writing. There are exceptions to this, however, which
have already been noted.11 Furthermore, additional formalities are
imposed upon contracts to convey a married woman's separate property or to relinquish her inchoate dower.
Specific performance of contracts to convey a married woman's
separate property and to relinquish her inchoate dower in Florida is
directly controlled by section 708.07 of the Florida Statutes. From the
enactment of Florida Revised Statutes in 1892 until May 27, 1947,
12
this statute read as follows:
Specific performance against married woman. Coverture shall
not prevent a decree against husband and wife to specifically
perform their written agreement to sell or convey the separate
property of the wife, or to relinquish her right of dower in the
property of the husband, but no agreement for the sale or
conveyance of her real property or for relinquishment of dower,
shall be specifically enforced unless it be executed and acknowledged in the form prescribed for conveyances of her real property and for relinquishment of dower.
Paraphrased, the statute required that contracts of a married
woman be executed and acknowledged in a certain form in order to
merit specific performance. The particulars of this formality were not
specified. Instead, the phrase "form prescribed for conveyances
of her real property and for relinquishment of dower" was used to define the formality required.
As the form of a conveyance and relinquishment was incorporated
by section 708.07 to regulate specific performance against a married
woman, one cannot know what contractual formalities are required
under section 708.07 unless he knows what form of "execution and
acknowledgment" is required to convey or relinquish. What, then,
are the formalitites required to convey a married woman's separate
property and to relinquish her dower?
Relinquishmentof Dower
Relinquishment of dower is controlled by two Florida Statutes,
13
sections 693.02 and 693.03. The former reads as follows:
11. See note 1 supra.
12. Fla. Rev. Gen. Stat. 1892, §2076.
13. FLA. STAT. §693.02 (1961).
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Release of dower. Any married woman having a right of dower
in any real property may relinquish it by joining in the
conveyance or mortgage thereof, or by a separate instrument
without the joinder of her husband, executed in like manner as
other conveyances.
The second statute controlling relinquishments of dower is section
693.03. This section covers both relinquishment of dower and conand until its amendment, it read
veyance of separate property,
14
substantially as follows:
Married women's acknowledgments. To render such sale,
conveyance, mortgage or relinquishment, whether of separate
estate or of dower, effectual to pass a married woman's estate
or right, she must acknowledge, before some officer authorized
to take acknowledgment of deeds, separately and apart from
her husband, that she executed the same freely and voluntarily
and without compulsion, constraint, apprehension or fear of or
from her husband, and the officer's certificate shall set forth all
the foregoing requirements.
Notice is directed to the fact that this statute required a separate
acknowledgment -to render such "relinquishment ... effective to
pass a married woman's estate or right . . . ." Consequently, an
acknowledgment as prescribed by it was a substantive requirement
supplementary to the form of execution required for relinquishments
under section 693.02.
The body of law controlling execution of relinquishments was but
one of two sources alluded to by section 708.07 in prescribing the
formality necessary for specific performance against a married woman.
Thus, in seeking the form required under section 708.07, one looked
first to the body of law controlling execution of relinquishments. Unfortunately, these statutes did not specify a form, but in turn were
incorporative of yet another body of law-the law of conveyances.
Coincidentally, this body of law was the second alluded to by section
708.07. It would seem, therefore, that should the statutes prescribing
the form for conveyances reveal complete detail, without further
circumvention, such detail would define the form for both sections
708.07 and 693.02.
14. Fla. Rev. Gen. Stat. 1920, §8803. See the provisos of Fla. Laws Feb. 4,
1835, §, and Fla. Laws 1877, ch. 3011, §1, for the language leading to the

wording of Fla. Rev. Gen. Stat. 1892, §1958, which is nearly identical to the instant statute. This statute was amended in 1948. A discussion of the amendment
will be found in text at note 22 infra.
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Conveyance of Separate Property
A married woman's conveyances are controlled by four Florida
statutes. First is section 693.01 which abrogates the common law,
thus allowing a married woman the privilege to convey.1 5 Second is
section 689.01, the conveyancing statute itself. That portion which
prescribes execution of conveyances requires the form of an "instrument in writing, signed in the presence of two subscribing witnesses
. ,,10
" Third is section 708.04, entitled Sales and conveyances. It
provides that "the husband and wife shall join in all sales, transfers
and conveyances of the property of the wife, other than personal property and choses in action."'17 The fourth is section 693.03. This is
entitled Married women's acknowledgments, and is complete as
quoted above.' 8
The incorporation by section 708.07 of the form of execution required for conveyances and the form for relinquishments is phrased
in the conjunctive. The formalities of both were seemingly required.
From this synthesis would come the form for contracts to convey or
relinquish under section 708.07. This synthesis is rendered unnecessary, however, by the fact that the formalities for execution of a
married woman's conveyances assimilate completely those formalities
of her relinquishments.
Consequently, one may say that the form of execution for specific
performance of a married woman's contract to convey or relinquish
under the original section 708.07 was simply that of her conveyance.
The form of her conveyance was:
(1) a written instrument (689.01),
(2) signed by her (689.01),
(3) joined by her husband (693.01 and 708.04),
(4) signed in the presence of two subscribing witnesses (689.01),
and
(5) acknowledged by her (693.03),
(6) separately and apart from her husband (693.03).
The husband's acknowledgment was required, not to render the
instrument valid, but only to entitle it to recordation. If the form of
execution under the original section 708.07 is the form of her conveyances, the above six criteria are those required for specific performance against a married woman under that statute.
15. FL.& STAT. §693.01 (1961).
16. FLA. STAT. §689.01 (1961).

17. FrA. STAT. §708.04 (1961).
18. Fla. Rev. Gen. Stat. 1920, §3803; see text at note 14, supra. Note that
this statute was substantially amended in 1948. See FLA. STAT. §693.03 (1961),
and text at note 22 infra.
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With these criteria one can deduce the impediment to specific
performance against a married woman under the original section
708.07 as compared with ordinary contracts to convey or relinquish
the same interest under the Statute of Frauds. Section 725.01 is a
re-enactment of the fourth section Statute of Frauds. When applicable it requires a writing signed by the transferror. 19 Had it not been
for section 708.07, a married woman's contract to convey or relinquish
dower would require only these two formalities for specific performance. But due to a woman's marital status, the following formalities
are additionally required: (1) two subscribing witnesses, (2) acknowledgment by the wife, (3) separate and apart from her husband,
and (4) joinder by her husband. These additional "status requirements" may be referred to as section 708.07 impediments to specific
performance against married women.
If the "form prescribed for conveyance of her real property and for
relinquishment of dower" is but the form prescribed for her deed of
conveyance (because of assimilation), one other ambiguity warrants
consideration. Section 708.07 commands that a married woman's contract to convey or relinquish be "executed and acknowledged" in this
form. Since acknowledgment was an integral part of the execution
of both conveyances and relinquishments, 20 it appears that the reiteration of "and acknowledged" is merely redundant of "execution."
ThE 1943 AcmrNmri

To SEcnoN

693.03

After studying the language of section 708.07, it becomes clear
that specific performance against a married woman requires the execution of her contract in the form required for the execution of her
conveyances. Since this form looks in part to section 693.03, it follows
that any change in section 693.03 would be incorporated by reference
into section 708.07. For this reason, when one inquires into the meaning of an amendment to section 693.03, he must bear in mind the
eventual and inevitable effect of such an amendment on specific performance against married women under section 708.07.
Section 693.03 existed in a form nearly identical to that set out
above 21 from the enactment of Florida Revised Statutes in 1892 until
May 13, 1943, when it was superseded by the present relevant portion
of 693.03:22

19.

FL.A. STAT. §725.01 (1961).
20. See text at note 14 supra.

21. Ibid.
22. FLA. STAT. §693.03 (1961).

(Emphasis added.)
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Married women's acknowledgments. The acknowledgment by
a married woman of deeds, conveyances, mortgages, relinquishments of dower, contracts for the sale of lands, powers of
attorney and other instruments shall be necessary to entitle any
such instrument to be recorded, but no private examination
separate from the husband of such married woman shall be
necessary for any purpose, and the acknowledgment of any
such instrument by a married woman shall not constitute any
part of the execution of any such instrument.
It would appear that the above 1943 amendment to section 693.03
made two changes in the requirement of a married woman's acknowledgements. The first was that no separateacknowledgment be required.
The second was that "the acknowledgment of any such instrument by
a married woman shall not constitute any part of the execution of any
such instrument."
By these changes, then, the entire matter of a married woman's
acknowledgments was relegated to the status of a procedural requirement necessary for recordation, but unrelated to the substantive validity of execution of instruments. Consequently, conveyances of a
married woman no longer required acknowledgment after the amendment of section 693.03. Acknowledgments remained significant for
recordation, but both her conveyances and contracts for relinquishment of dower could be executed and of full legal force without any
acknowledgment.
Since section 708.07 looked in part to section 693.03 for specification of the impediment to specific performance against a married
woman, seemingly, section 708.07 would also have been "amended"
by these changes in section 693.03. But before one can speculate on
the effect of an amendment to section 693.03 upon secondary statutes,
he must be certain of the significance of the amendment upon the
principal statute.
In compiling judicial opinions concerning the significance of the
1943 amendment to section 693.03, the first case interpreting the
change was Berlin v. lacobs.23 In 1945, Maurice Jacobs sought specific
performance of a contract with Samuel Berlin and his wife for the
sale of homestead realty and relinquishment of Mrs. Berlin's inchoate
dower. In denying specific performance the Florida Supreme Court
stated that under section 708.07, "unless a contract is so executed
and acknowledged by the married woman the court is without authority or power to require specific performance of the contract."2 4
23. 156 Fla. 773, 24 So. 2d 717 (1945).
24. Id. at 718. (Emphasis added.)
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The date of the contract involved in this case is not stated, but
from the consideration given therein to sections 708.08, 708.09, and
708.10, which became effective respectively on June 4, May 11, and
June 4, 1943, it seems clear -thatthe contract was made after the effective date of those sections. If so, the present section 693.03, effective
May 13, 1943, was also in effect. The court did not specify in the
instant case whether it was a defective execution or a defective acknowledgment that constituted the defense to specific performance,
but the decision seems erroneous to the extent that it either holds or
suggests that the defective acknowledgment of a married woman
constituted such a defense under the statutes in effect when the contract was made.
The Florida Supreme Court again appeared oblivious to the 1943
amendment of section 693.03 in Jensen v. Skibski,2 5 a 1946 case. Here,
defendants, husband and wife, sought to defeat specific performance
of a contract for the sale of realty by alleging that no acknowledgment
of the wife was taken at the time of the execution of the contract.
While this defense was correctly struck down, the court's reasoning
seemed far from appropriate. The court ignored the precise language
of section 693.03, which expressly states that acknowledgments no
longer constitute any part of the execution of the instrument and
instead stated that the certification of an acknowledgment such as
apparent on the face of this contract is, absent fraud, conclusive as to
the facts stated.
In 1950, however, the Florida Supreme Court, in Scott v. Hotel
Martinique,20 belatedly recognized the 1943 amendment to section
693.03. In this case the appellants-vendors, husband and wife, sought
to defeat specific performance of a written contract to convey their
homestead property. Relying on Berlin, appellants contended that
although their contract was otherwise valid, the absence of an acknowledgment by the wife would preclude specific performance of
the contract. In affirming the decree of specific performance for the
appellee-vendee, the court noted that "since the amendment of Section
693.03 . ..an acknowledgement [sic] by a married woman is not
necessary to the 'due execution' by her of deeds, mortgages, relinquishments of dower, contracts for the sale of land, and the like. Her
acknowledgment is necessary only to entitle such instruments to
recordation."27
If Scott confirmed the logical interpretation of the 1943 amendment
to section 693.03 what was to be the impact of the amendment,
25. 158 Fla. 331,28 So. 2d 328 (1946).
26. 48 So. 2d 160 (Fla. 1950).
27. Id. at 161.
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especially with regard to its secondary effect on section 708.07? This
question became especially significant in 1947 when section 708.07
was formally amended.
ThE 1947 AwmNDrT To SECON 708.07
After amendment, section 708.07 read as follows: 28
Specific performance against married woman. Coverturd
shall not prevent a decree against husband and wife or either
of them to specifically perform their written agreement to sell
or convey the separate property of the wife or to relinquish
her right of dower in the property of the husband, regardless
of whether the same shall be acknowledged or not.
The 1947 amendment to section 708.07 consisted of both additions
to and omissions from the former statute.29 Paraphrased, the statute
prior to the amendment commanded that the marital status of a
woman should not impede the specific performance of her contracts,
but that no contract should be specifically enforced unless executed
in the same form as her conveyances.
In the amended statute, however, the proviso was omitted and
supplemented with another phrase. The amended statute provided
that the married status of a woman was not to impede the specific
performance of her contract to convey, regardless whether acknowledged or not.
Before 1947, section 708.07 denied specific performance of a married woman's contract to convey or relinquish dower unless executed
in the same form as her conveyances. After 1943, her conveyances
no longer required acknowledgment,3" and therefore, neither did her
contract to convey under section 708.07. Consequently the new
phrase which was added in 1947 to section 708.07 and which removed
the requirement of acknowledgment was merely a reiteration of an
accomplished fact. The essential change wrought by the 1947 amendment, then, is not in what was added, but in what was taken away-the
requirement of execution in the form prescribed for a married
woman's conveyances. This would mean that contracts to relinquish
inchoate dower and convey separate property of married women need
no longer be executed with two subscribing witnesses. It would mean
that any writing which would satisfy the Statute of Frauds in the
general contract-for-deed context would suffice in these transactions
as well.
28.

FLA. STAT.

§708.07 (1961).

29. Cf. text at note 12 supra.
30. See text at note 22 supra.
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HoMEsTEAD CASES DiSTnGUISHED

The first case to consider directly section 708.07, as amended, was
Abercrombie v. Eidschun,31 which came before the Florida Supreme
Court on a writ of certiorari in 1953. The contract sought to be specifically enforced against a vendor husband and wife was one for the
conveyance of their homestead property. The contract had but one
witness to its execution. The chancellor of the lower court, in his
decree denying summary judgment, stated that it was clear that if
the 1947 amendment dispensed with acknowledgment of her contract, it dispensed as well with witnesses. 32 The decree of the chancellor was, however, quashed by the Florida Supreme Court. Summing up, the court ruled that "section 708.07 .. .as amended, did
not dispense with the requirement of two subscribing witnesses but
only with the formal requirement of acknowledgment." 38
This holding merits careful examination, for it is the first direct
pronouncement upon section 708.07, as amended; and it is the bottom
rung in a ladder of cases which either reiterate this pronouncement
or enlarge it into an unqualified rule that section 708.07 did not eliminate two witnesses as a requirement for specific performance against
married women. As this holding is in conflict with the interpretation
one would have expected of section 708.07, it becomes important to
consider why the court ruled as it did in Abercrombie. In addition,
it becomes important to step further back into the process of judicial
3 4 the sole case upon
reasoning to the case of Scott v. Hotel Martinique,
which the court in Abercrombie relied and from which the court
quoted extensively. By picking up the discussion of contracts to
convey homestead in the Scott case, and tracing its development to
another case, Zimmerman v. Diedrich,8 5 it may be possible to say that
the rule in Abercrombie has less general application than would otherwise appear.
The discussion of law in Scott v. Hotel Martinique began with a
recognition of the constitutional requirement that alienation of homestead by a husband and wife requires the "due execution of the deed
by both."386 When the Abercrombie opinion quoted the Scott case on
this point, the expression "due execution" was underscored, but not
the word "deed."37

Subsequently, the Zimmerman opinion reading

the Abercrombie interpretation of the Scott case concluded that it
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

66 So. 2d 875 (Fla. 1953).
Ibid.
Id. at 876.
48 So. 2d 160 (Fla. 1950).
97 So. 2d 120 (Fla. 1957).
48 So. 2d 160, 161 (Fla. 1950).
66 So. 2d 875, 876 (Fla. 1953).
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"is plain from a study of expressions of this court on the subject [of
homestead], and especially from the very decision, Scott v. Hotel
Martinique, Inc., quoted at length in Abercrombie v. Eidschun...
that the controlling law was Sees. 1 and 4 of Article X of the Constitution."3s
Thus, starting with the recognition by Scott that the constitution
expressly required "due execution of deeds" for homestead, Zimmerman evolved the rule that the constitution also contemplated the
control of the execution of contracts for deeds. This transition from
deed to contract for deed was formulated by the following expression
of the court:8 9
It is true that in that section [section 4 of article X of the
constitution] no mention is made of contracts to sell, but only
of deeds and mortgages. We apprehend that the writers of the
opinions had in mind that if the execution of contracts to sell
homesteads were not so formalized, the transfer of homestead
property, sacrosanct as it is, could be eventually effected by
decree of specific performance, although the contract forming
the basis of such a transfer would have small resemblance to
the formality with which it was intended that conveyances of
homesteads should be accomplished.
Not only did the Zimmerman case make the transition from deed
to contract for deed, but suggested as well that "due execution" of a
contract for deed should be of equal dignity to that of the deed itself.
Consider the above quotation with emphasis to the following: 'We
apprehend . . . that if the execution of contracts to sell homestead
were not so formalized . . . homestead property, sacrosanct as it is
. . :40 could ultimately be disturbed by contracts of less formality
of deeds. Perhaps even more conclusive is the following
than that 41
language:
In fine, we conclude after a careful study of the Constitution
and the decisions [Scott and Abercrombie], and the statutes
cited in the decisions, that the court meant that agreements to
convey homestead property must, to be specifically enforceable, be signed in the presence of two witnesses as required
by Sec. 689.01... for valid conveyances, and by Sec. 708.07...
for enforceable contracts to convey the separate property of
married women and to relinquish dower.
38.
39.
40.
41.

97 So. 2d 120, 123 (Fla. 1957).
Id. at 123, 124.
Id. (Emphasis added.)
Id. at 124.
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Now return to the rule in Abercrombie v. Eidschun that "Sec.
708.07 did not dispense with the requirement of two subscribing
42
witnesses but only with the formal requirement of acknowledgment."
The query posed was, whether this rule, ostensibly dealing with the
general effect of section 708.07, should be restricted to something less
general than appears prima facie. It is submitted that Zimmerman
is authority for an affirmative answer to the question, because Zimmerman confined the Abercrombie decision to the special considerations
of homestead, restricting its rule by propriety, if not intent, to such
limits. Thus a more precise statement of the rule in Abercrombie,
after consideration of Zimmerman, would read as follows: section
708.07 did not dispense with the requirement of two subscribing
witnesses for contracts to convey homestead, because these contracts
are within the scope of the Florida Constitution. As such they are
beyond the reach of statutory control.
TnE Zimmerman INTmEPpErAnoN oF SErIoN 708.07
If the cases just discussed can be distinguished from non-homestead cases and restricted to the authority of the Florida Constitution
for their suggestion, collectively or individually, that two subscribing
witnesses are necessary to the execution of contracts to convey homestead, the consequence is simply to remove these cases from the
discussion of section 708.07 as amended. Once these cases are removed, however, the question of what formalities section 708.07 now
requires for specific performance against a married woman remains unanswered.
Looking for authority not restricted to the special considerations
of homestead, the first case clearly unconcerned with homestead was
Lindgren v. Van Fleet,43 which came before the district court of appeal
in 1958. At bar was the issue whether an oral 44 contract for the conveyance of a husband's land, and for the relinquishment of his wife's
inchoate dower interest in the land could be specifically enforced.
Reversing a final decree for specific performance, the court conceded
that "some doubt and confusion were produced by the enactment in
1943 of chapter 21746 (section 693.03 . . . ) and in 1947 of chapter
23820 (by which section 708.07 . . . was amended)," 45 but the court
42. 66 So. 2d 875, 876 (Fla. 1953).
43. 101 So. 2d 155 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1958), reo'd on other grounds, Van Fleet
v. Lindgren, 107 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 1958).
44. Circumstances revealed by the record were apparently sufficient to have
required specific performance by the vendor husband and wife's oral contract
under the authority of note 1, supra, had it not been for the construction of FLA.
STAT. §708.07 (1961).
45, 101 So. 2d 155, 156 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1958).
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noted that "such doubt and confusion as were occasioned by the mentioned legislation have been dispelled, however, by the court's opinion
in Zimmerman v. Diedrich ...
-46 With this erroneous reliance on
Zimmerman as a predicate, the court stated the rule upon which its
holding was based: "In Zimmerman v. Diedrich ... the court concluded . . . that a married woman's contract for the relinquishment
of her inchoate dower interest . . . cannot be specifically enforced
unless it be in writing and its execution witnessed by not less than
two subscribing witnesses." 47
The chancellor in Zimmerman had denied specific performance of
the seller's contract to convey certain realty on the theory that sections
689.01, the conveyancing statute, and 725.01, the Statute of Frauds,
must be read together. The chancellor believed that these statutes
together required that no contract for deed be specifically enforced
unless executed in the presence of two subscribing witnesses. The
opinion of the chancellor, cited as error, placed emphasis on the
1941 amendment to section 689.01, which substituted the word "instrument" for the word "deed."48 He relied upon Scott, Abercrombie,
and one other case to support his view that this language was intended
to bring all contracts to convey under the same authority.49 Such authority, reasoned the chancellor, would be the conveyancing statute,
section 689.01, which required two subscribing witnesses. On appellate review, however, the cases relied upon by the chancellor were
shown to be homestead situations, controlled by the constitution,
and not authority for the theory proposed.50 With these homestead
cases whittled away from the chancellor's theory, the court proceeded
to examine other authority purporting to require two subscribing
witnesses to the execution of a contract to convey. This procedure
was necessary because any authority requiring two subscribing witnesses to the contract would require that the chancellor's decree be
affirmed, regardless of his reasoning.
At this point, the court turned to section 708.07. It was noted that
the "court [in Abercrombie] observed that See. 708.07 . . . when
amended 'did not dispense with the requirement of two subscribing
witnesses but only with the formal requirement of acknowledgment.' ,, Following this quotation from Abercrombie, the court summarized the legislative development pertinent to section 708.07, considering the significance of section 693.03, its amendment, and the 1947
46. Ibid.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Ibid.
Zimmerman v. Diedrich, 97 So. 2d 120, 122 (Fla. 1957).
Ibid.

Ibid.
Id. at 123.
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amendment to section 708.07. The court concluded of the latter
amendment that "before the amendment [contracts under section
708.07] had to be executed in the presence of two [subscribing] witthe amendment an acnesses and acknowledged by the wife; after
52
necessary."
longer
no
was
knowledgment
If this interpretation, with its tacit denial that acknowledgments
were unnecessary, was correct, the ultimate holding that section
708.07 did not remove the requirement of subscribing witnesses, followed as a reasonable sequela. Undeniably, prior to the 1947 amendment, section 708.07 did require two subscribing witnesses. If the
1947 amendment removed only the need for acknowledgments, the
requirement of two subscribing witnesses remained. The fallacy of
the analysis then, if any, lay in the tacit implication that acknowledgments were in fact necessary under section 708.07 until amendment.
Why did Zimmerman conclude that the 1947 amendment removed
only the requirement for acknowledgments and did not remove the
two-witnesses requirement? The answer lies in retracing the significance attributed to the 1943 amendment of section 693.03. According to Zimmerman "the necessity of separate acknowledgment of
married women to their deeds and contracts was eliminated by
amendment in 1943 of Sec. 693.03."53 Recalling the discussion of this
amendment earlier, it will be remembered that the 1943 amendment
to section 693.03 in fact removed the need for separate acknowledgments, but also eliminated the need of acknowledgments for the valid
execution of her instruments for all purposes except recordation."
Thus to say that section 693.03 when amended, eliminated separate
acknowledgments without more, was to suggest or hold, (in either
case erroneously), that section 693.03, as amended, eliminated only
the necessity of separate acknowledgments. This error was accepted
and emphasized in Lindgren: when paraphrasing Zimmerman, the
word "separate" was italicized 5
When the court arrived at its consideration of the amendment to
section 708.07, its interpretation suffered from this oversight. Said
the court: "Before the amendment [to Section 708.07] such a
contract had to be executed in the presence of two witnesses and
acknowledged by the wife; after the amendment an acknowledgment
was no longer necessary." 6 The effect of such error was to spend the
full effect of the 1947 amendment to section 708.07 on the phrase
52. Ibid.
53. Ibid.
54. Scott v. Hotel Martinique, 48 So. 2d 160 (Fla. 1950); and see text at

note 21 mupra.
55. 101 So. 2d 155, 156 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1958).
56. Zimmerman v. Diedrich, 97 So. 2d 120, 123 (Fla. 1957).
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added. This phrase was mere duplication of the accomplished fact
that a married woman's contracts might be specifically enforced "regardless of whether the same were acknowledged or not."2' Ignored
because of this emphasis was the deletion of the former provision
of section 708.07, that required execution and acknowledgment "in
the form prescribed for conveyances ... .'51
In summary, then, from a standpoint of statutory interpretation,
it should be noted that any construction of the 1947 amendment to
section 708.07 must take into full account not only that the statute
had already been amended by implication in the 1943 amendment of
section 693.03, but also the full effect of both the omissions and the
additions which comprised that 1947 amendment. The cases that
have arisen to interpret this amendment to section 708.07 have developed special standards for homestead property; these homestead
standards have then been applied to non-homestead situations, and
the statutory changes have been interpreted, erroneously guided by
these cases.
CONCLUSION

It is not suggested that the consideration of section 693.03 in its
full significance would have bound the court in the Zimmerman case
to a different reading of the 1947 amendment to section 708.07, and
consequently to a different holding. The import of section 693.03 is
simply that, since the legislature had already retired the requirement
of acknowledgments as a substantive requirement of execution, the
change in section 708.07 must have been made with something else
in mind. Section 693.03 is not, then, direct authority for the abolition
of the requirement for two subscribing witnesses. It merely directs
attention from the phrase included in the 1947 amendment, to the
one omitted, which, squarely faced, could have resulted in this conclusion. This possibility becomes especially persuasive when one
considers the express language of section 708.07:59
Specific performance against married woman. Coverture
shall not prevent a decree against husband and wife or either of
them to specifically perform their written agreement to sell or
convey the separate property of the wife or to relinquish her
right of dower in the property of the husband, regardless of
whether the same shall be acknowledged or not.
57. FLA.

STAT.

§708.07 (1961).

58. Fla. Rev. Gen. Stat. 1892, §2076.
59. FLA. STAT. §708.07 (1961).
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In view of the salient phrase of section 708.07, which positively
asserts that "coverture shall not prevent" specific performance, it is
indeed ironic that the Florida Supreme Court should conclude that
the 1947 amendment did not contemplate the elimination of witnesses
to the execution of contracts to convey a married woman's property
or to relinquish her dower, especially since the Florida Supreme Court
as early as 1886 held that a contract to convey land could be specifically enforced against a single person without the necessity of witnesses. 60 Such an interpretation is comprehensible only in the presence of oversight, misinterpretation, and a failure to relegate the
constitutional basis for Abercrombie to homestead alone.
If, from a purely legal standpoint, the Florida Supreme Court
could have arrived at a different interpretation of section 708.07, it
becomes equally important, in predicting judicial trends, to consider
whether or not the court should have reached a different result. To
this consideration two factors seem most important. First, is this a
tempest in the teapot of legal abstractions; and second, assuming
sufficient practical effect to warrant further consideration, what social
interests are served by this impediment to specific performance
against married women?
The effect of the holding in Zimmerman touches the specific performance of every contract to convey real property in Florida where
the vendor-defendant is married, and both spouses living."' It would
seem, without an offering of statistics, that this fact alone would
emphasize and support the practical ramifications of this holding.
Since Florida has been somewhat unwilling to grant specific performance of the husband's interest with abatement of the purchase price
for the inchoate dower interest outstanding, 2the rule of Zimmerman
poses a serious problem to the uninitiated.
If the above suggests an inequitable condition in Florida, can it be
justified on the basis of commensurate social need? Are women, for
example, in danger of suffering the casual loss of their dower or
separate property, and if so, is the hazard one which will be
remedied by greater contractual formalities? An examination of the
cases where this rule was enforced reveals the wife as the pirate.
It is she who enters into, acquiesces in, and ratifies contracts by acts
which would be sufficient to compel specific performance against her
husband. But she, under the cover of section 708.07, as interpreted
60. Lente v. Clarke, 22 Fla. 515, 1 So. 149 (1886).
61. If the wife is the vendor, the application of section 708.07 is patent. If
the husband is the vendor, the wife must relinquish dower. One exception to the
statement in the text above arises when the wife is a free dealer.
62. See Van Fleet v. Lindgren, 107 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 1958); Bland v. Knoblock, 92 Fla. 254, 109 So. 415 (1926).
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by Zimmerman, can withdraw at her convenience, leaving the disappointed purchaser to his remedy at law, if any exists.
As the court apologetically recognized in Berlin v. Jacobs,63 "Except
for [section 708.07] it is quite evident that in equity and good conf4
science [the wife] should be required to perform the contract ....
In Dixon v. Clayton, following facobs on this point, a married woman
had accepted from a prospective purchaser a part of the purchase
price and had placed him in possession of the land, yet the court
recognized no latitude under the existing law. The court noted that
"it may well be that from a standpoint of ethics she should not escape
any easier the obligations of the agreement than would her husband
...
"65 Nevertheless, specific performance was denied.
The above expressions of the court were quoted approvingly in
Lindgren in 1958 for essentially the same situation.66 Thus there is
both evidence of a change in sentiment and some basis in fact and
in law for judicial reconsideration of the present interpretation of
section 708.07. Both this judicial disposition and the law favor the
conclusion that no contract of a married woman, except one concerning homestead, requires more formality in execution than is necessary
for specific performance under the Statute of Frauds.

63.
64.
65.
66.

156 Fla. 773, 24 So. 2d 717 (1945).
Id. at 773, 24 So. 2d at 718. (Emphasis added.)
Dixon v. Clayton, 44 So. 2d 76, 77 (Fla. 1949).
101 So. 2d 155, 156 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1958).
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